Comments Posted By andy
Displaying 151 To 160 Of 258 Comments
CIA VS. THE WHITE HOUSE: THE CHICKENS COME HOME TO ROOST
Dale,
I've been there done that too, but I don't want to get into an argument over who has more experience, because it really doesn't matter.
Pushing through additional collection was only one of the things that happened. You could even say that Joe Wilson was a result as he was basically an open source collector sent to gather information. Whatever you may think or whatever your experience, policy people do have an effect on and can direct collections. Intelligence is subordinate to policy, which makes it hard for intelligence to be independent. Now, were policy people, for example, tasking a specific satellite to take a specific picture at a specific time of a specific target? Of course not. But policy has a huge influence on the overall collection plan which is what I was talking about.
As for Paul Pillar, I disagree with your assessment of him. Here’s a quote from the interview:
Well, I give the administration, in the view of some of the people who responded to what I’ve written, too much credit, but I really believe this: that the main motivation for Operation Iraqi Freedom was to stir up the politics and economics of the Middle East and use regime change in Iraq as a stimulus for regime change and other kinds of changes elsewhere in the region, leading to more open political and economic structures.
In short, the rhetoric that we have heard more recently from the administration, including President Bush’s eloquent second inaugural address about democratization, I believe is sincere and honest with regard to the major reasons and major motivations.
Yeah, that sounds like a left-leaning partisan Bush-hating political hack to me. He certainly isn’t a right-winger, and he is critical of the Bush administration in many areas, but your characterization is completely unfair. His criticisms of the administration are pretty accurate as are his criticisms of the intelligence community.
I will remind you, I WAS IN IRAQ; in addition; I spent major time with several dozen of the best WMD experts, that the US Military had to offer; and let me tell you; their conclusions were completely opposite the politically tinged and corrupt ISG, both in the Gulf War, and in this, the Iraq War; knowning what I know about both groups; I trust the Military guys hands down.
Politically tinged and corrupt ISG? That is a load of hooey. It may surprise you to know that many people in the ISG were, and remain, in the military, including three I know personally. These were no tinged and corrupt hacks. These conspiracy theories circulating about how the ISG ignored or hid evidence of WMD are ludicrous.
I’d be interested in know what unit the “several dozen†experts you were with in Iraq. I’m betting they were part of a CBRNE defense unit in which case they only have the most basic tools and expertise to identify and categorize WMD. How many of them had degrees in chemistry or biology? How many had PhD’s in chemistry or biology and have spent their careers studying WMD? The ISG military and civilian people I know all have doctorates and have done WMD research their whole careers. But they’re “politically tinged†and “corrupt†so when they found evidence of WMD, the just ignored it because they hate Bush. Or maybe they altered the test results – or maybe both. All the kool-aid has made me dizzy and I forget.
You misread my comment on agriculture, but I used a poorly worded double-negative so it’s understandable (I said “not non-prolificâ€). I agree that Iraq had a very robust agricultural chemical production capability. They used agricultural chemicals extensively for agricultural purposes. And yes, it did serve as a partial cover for their chem program. But again, that does not prove there were, or are, weapons in the country.
Well, actally, there is evidence, to suggest that AQ and Iraq, were connected, in many ways, and the whole crop duster thing, is one of those pieces of evidence, that undoubtedly indicate an Iraqi Intelligence connection to AQ.
Ok, you have a lot in this sentence; let me go through it one at a time. First, yes there is evidence to suggest that AQ and Iraq had some kind of limited connection. No, the whole crop-duster thing is not evidence of that. Just because Iraq had crop-dusters that had the potential to carry chems and AQ expressed interest in using crop-dusters, among other methods, to possibly deliver chems, does not mean that those two pieces of information are “undoubtedly†related! Until you produce some piece of evidence that the two were working together on crop-dusting, then you’re full of shit. That kind of logic is the worst kind of crap imaginable. That’s like saying the IRA used car bombs, and AQ used car bombs – OMG, they must be working together on car-bomb technology!
Since you’re a “been there, done that†kind of intel guy whose been trained to evaluate information, I’m sure you’re familiar with these concepts:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disconfirmation_bias
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusory_correlation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myside_bias
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polarization_effect
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AnchoringAnd here’s the big one, which we are all guilty of at one time or another:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bias_blind_spotFinally, I see you ignored everything I said on the ballistic missile NIE in 1995.
PS: If you want a less “politicized†article than Pillars in the policy-analyst relationship, read this:
https://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/docs/v02n2p.htm
Donkatsu,I suspect if we did not have a war on now the institute would be gutted and rebooted.
Actually, that is pretty much happening now. Almost all of the CIA’s analysis functions are in the process of being moved under the new DNI organization. The CIA will, essentially, become a HUMINT collection agency, but even the DoD is muscling in on that action.
Actually, I don’t know why Rick and the rest of you keep talking like the CIA like it was still the lead agency in the IC – it is not.
Comment Posted By Andy On 24.08.2006 @ 23:49
Dale,
I've been there done that too, but I don't want to get into an argument over who has more experience, because it really doesn't matter.
Pushing through additional collection was only one of the things that happened. You could even say that Joe Wilson was a result as he was basically an open source collector sent to gather information. Whatever you may think or whatever your experience, policy people do have an effect on and can direct collections. Intelligence is subordinate to policy, which makes it hard for intelligence to be independent. Now, were policy people, for example, tasking a specific satellite to take a specific picture at a specific time of a specific target? Of course not. But policy has a huge influence on the overall collection plan which is what I was talking about.
As for Paul Pillar, I disagree with your assessment of him. Here’s a quote from the interview:
Well, I give the administration, in the view of some of the people who responded to what I’ve written, too much credit, but I really believe this: that the main motivation for Operation Iraqi Freedom was to stir up the politics and economics of the Middle East and use regime change in Iraq as a stimulus for regime change and other kinds of changes elsewhere in the region, leading to more open political and economic structures.
In short, the rhetoric that we have heard more recently from the administration, including President Bush’s eloquent second inaugural address about democratization, I believe is sincere and honest with regard to the major reasons and major motivations.
Yeah, that sounds like a left-leaning partisan Bush-hating political hack to me. He certainly isn’t a right-winger, and he is critical of the Bush administration in many areas, but your characterization is completely unfair. His criticisms of the administration are pretty accurate as are his criticisms of the intelligence community.
I will remind you, I WAS IN IRAQ; in addition; I spent major time with several dozen of the best WMD experts, that the US Military had to offer; and let me tell you; their conclusions were completely opposite the politically tinged and corrupt ISG, both in the Gulf War, and in this, the Iraq War; knowning what I know about both groups; I trust the Military guys hands down.
Politically tinged and corrupt ISG? That is a load of hooey. It may surprise you to know that many people in the ISG were, and remain, in the military, including three I know personally. These were no tinged and corrupt hacks. These conspiracy theories circulating about how the ISG ignored or hid evidence of WMD are ludicrous.
I’d be interested in know what unit the “several dozen†experts you were with in Iraq. I’m betting they were part of a CBRNE defense unit in which case they only have the most basic tools and expertise to identify and categorize WMD. How many of them had degrees in chemistry or biology? How many had PhD’s in chemistry or biology and have spent their careers studying WMD? The ISG military and civilian people I know all have doctorates and have done WMD research their whole careers. But they’re “politically tinged†and “corrupt†so when they found evidence of WMD, the just ignored it because they hate Bush. Or maybe they altered the test results – or maybe both. All the kool-aid has made me dizzy and I forget.
You misread my comment on agriculture, but I used a poorly worded double-negative so it’s understandable (I said “not non-prolificâ€). I agree that Iraq had a very robust agricultural chemical production capability. They used agricultural chemicals extensively for agricultural purposes. And yes, it did serve as a partial cover for their chem program. But again, that does not prove there were, or are, weapons in the country.
Well, actally, there is evidence, to suggest that AQ and Iraq, were connected, in many ways, and the whole crop duster thing, is one of those pieces of evidence, that undoubtedly indicate an Iraqi Intelligence connection to AQ.
Ok, you have a lot in this sentence; let me go through it one at a time. First, yes there is evidence to suggest that AQ and Iraq had some kind of limited connection. No, the whole crop-duster thing is not evidence of that. Just because Iraq had crop-dusters that had the potential to carry chems and AQ expressed interest in using crop-dusters, among other methods, to possibly deliver chems, does not mean that those two pieces of information are “undoubtedly†related! Until you produce some piece of evidence that the two were working together on crop-dusting, then you’re full of shit. That kind of logic is the worst kind of crap imaginable. That’s like saying the IRA used car bombs, and AQ used car bombs – OMG, they must be working together on car-bomb technology!
Since you’re a “been there, done that†kind of intel guy whose been trained to evaluate information, I’m sure you’re familiar with these concepts:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disconfirmation_bias
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusory_correlation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myside_bias
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polarization_effect
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AnchoringAnd here’s the big one, which we are all guilty of at one time or another:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bias_blind_spotFinally, I see you ignored everything I said on the ballistic missile NIE in 1995.
PS: If you want a less “politicized†article than Pillars in the policy-analyst relationship, read this:
https://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/docs/v02n2p.htm
Donkatsu,I suspect if we did not have a war on now the institute would be gutted and rebooted.
Actually, that is pretty much happening now. Almost all of the CIA’s analysis functions are in the process of being moved under the new DNI organization. The CIA will, essentially, become a HUMINT collection agency, but even the DoD is muscling in on that action.
Actually, I don’t know why Rick and the rest of you keep talking like the CIA like it was still the lead agency in the IC – it is not.
PPS: For the record, I've been a pretty consistent supporter of the war, but for different reason than the administration advertised it as. It's clear in hindsight that we would have had to take out Saddam sooner or later. When we did was as good a time as any. It's just too bad that the post-overthrow preparation and planning was so hideously sloppy, and ignored ample warnings of what would come with rosy predictions. I guess that's what happens when policy trumps, ignores, and thinks it knows analysis better than intelligence.
Comment Posted By Andy On 24.08.2006 @ 23:48
Ok, a couple of issues here.
First, the primary problem between the current administration and the IC is political meddling by policy people into intelligence. It’s pretty clear from the press reporting that if the current administration doesn’t like a particular conclusion, they will send it back to have it looked at again. One way this has a negative effect is that intelligence collection assets are specifically tasked to look for information that might support the so-called “alternative analysis†put forth by the policy maker. I don’t want to get into the weeds here, but if you focus collection assets on finding evidence for a particular point of view, then the chance is great that you will find it. What you won’t find is evidence that would contradict that view, so the data becomes skewed toward the policy position even though that may not reflect reality. Intelligence professionals are trained to avoid this pitfall, policy people are not.
To explain it another way, we have limited collection assets. If we have a room full of doors we only have the capability to open some of them to see what information they might contain. The essence of the dispute here is that the policy makers are telling the intelligence professionals which doors to open, and they’re doing it to support their own biases and in contravention of established social science principals to not only reduce bias, but also to ensure a wide range of data to make accurate judgments. As an analogy, its akin to the hospital administrator telling the doctors in the ER how to diagnose a patient.
For a more eloquent explanation, I’d turn to Paul Pillar who is a respected former CIA analyst. His interview here is very enlightening:
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10097/intelligence_policy_and_the_war_in_iraq_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.htmlAnd his article in Foreign Affairs is a must read:
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85202/paul-r-pillar/intelligence-policy-and-the-war-in-iraq.htmlThis isn’t to say there are not problems in the IC itself, but I see the interference of non-intelligence professionals into the intelligence process as the main concern. In that kind of environment, it’s difficult for analysts to make accurate judgments. This isn’t new with this group of leaders, in fact. Consider the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile threat in 1998. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm Look at the list of participants and read the executive summary for their main conclusions, most of which I feel are bogus. This commission was created in response to the 1995 NIE which stated that any other country besides Russia and China were 15 years away from the ability to strike America with a ballistic missile. Several prominent republicans (Gingrich, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz to name three) thought the estimate was flawed, so the commission was born. Well, we’re now 11 years since the NIE came out and its assessment looks pretty good so far. The commission’s assessment of 5 years has come and gone and it’s not like Iran, North Korea or anyone else has slowed or stopped their missile programs.
So that is a concrete example of where policy people who disagree, for whatever reason, with the intelligence inject themselves into the process, make their own assessments, and then pursue policy based on their own assessments. The 1995 NIE that produced that estimate was based on the available intelligence which was analyzed not only by intelligence professionals, but also by actual rocket scientists who know the science and what it takes to design, build and deploy a ballistic missile. No one on the Rumsfeld commission had professional intelligence experience, nor were they experts in the science, and their conclusions certainly showed their ignorance.
This type of meddling continues today and it is a sad state of affairs indeed.
Donkatsu,
The water-pesticide thing was wrong. The detection equipment our forces are issued for that kind of thing are notorious for false positives and are really designed so a grunt can check if an area might be contaminated. Determining if the chemicals present were WMD related takes sample collection and basic lab analysis. To my knowledge, the ISG sampled most of these areas, sent them back to the WMD analysis experts and they were determined not to have come from WMD.
Also, the agricultural sector was not as non-prolific as you state. The Iraqis had several crop-dusting aircraft that we kept a close watch on because they could be used to deploy certain kinds of chem and bio weapons. It’s also pretty well known (and obvious) that crop dusters make good dispersal vehicles, so it’s no surprise that AQ was looking into them. What it does not indicate is that Iraq and AQ were somehow associated in that regard, and furthermore, there is no evidence at all to support that they were.
Comment Posted By Andy On 24.08.2006 @ 17:34
TallDave,
I agree with some of what you say, but you leave out important details that have long-term implications. Specifically, loyalty of the newly created ISF and military forces. If these units are loyal to the central government, particularly after we leave Iraq, then yes, everything you say is true. However, the reality is that their loyalty is suspect because of historic emphasis on tribal/religious/ethnic affiliation as well as infiltration and subversion by 3rd parties, primarily Shia militants. Additionally, there are many reports of armed men dressed in Iraqi Police uniforms kidnapping and murdering scores of people. It's not clear if these are rogue members of ISF units or simply militants with ISF uniforms. But to the general population, especially the Sunnis, the distinction matters little because it breeds distrust of the ISF and therefore the central government. As a result, the populations' loyalty remains with their faction rather than the government.
So there are two issues here that must be resolved for your scenario to happen and it all comes down to loyalty: The ISF must have demonstrable loyalty to the central governemnt, and the population must have a modicum of trust in the ISF - at least enough to know they will not be their murder victims. In both cases the situation looks pretty grim. If these two issues are not resolved, then there certainly will be additional civil disorder if not civil war once we leave.
My personal opinion is that Iraq will end up like Lebanon in many ways - a weak central government with armed factions it cannot control. It's already like that with the Kurds, who de facto independent. Open civil war will certainly occur should we leave soon. All around it's not a pretty picture.
Comment Posted By Andy On 23.08.2006 @ 00:03
Mark,
To the extent that AQ and Iraq could have been allied, it could only have been in the most myopic marriage of convenience created by a general "enemy of my enemy is my friend" attitude. Saddam was a secular dictator and pre-war Iraq was not a fundamentalist state by any stretch of the imagination - on the contrary, while it was a repressive police state, the police were not used to enforce Shariah, but rather to squash political opposition (that includes the rise of fundamentalist opposition). AQ is a fundamentalist organization which considers even the Saudi regime to be overly secular. It's not a distortion to say that the two entities are natural enemies. Of course, as I stated in my earlier comment, all the multitude of disparate groups in the Mideast can find common ground in bashing America...that's the main reason they bash America - they get street credibility for it. And to the extent that Iraq and AQ were both happy about 9/11, probably hinges on that. Saddam has been in a pissing match with the US since Kuwait. I'm not surprised he didn't go out of his way to help us arrest al-Qaeda members. That doesn't mean that the two weren't fundamentally at odds with each other. If you think about it, it is obvious that they are. It seems more likely to me that al-Qaeda viewed that Iraqi invasion as an opportunity (opening up Iraq), than as a setback. I'm not trying to distort or rewrite history here, I'm trying to take an honest look at the different interest groups involved in the situation.
Comment Posted By Andy On 22.08.2006 @ 12:49
Rick, Andy:
You're right about Rafsanjani and Khatami. They could be considered moderate in the Iranian context, but certainly aren't moderates to the west. It's important to note the nuclear program is almost universally supported by all the factions in the Iranian government including the "liberals" and "moderates." The issue for the majority of Iranians is one of prestige and nationalism, as well as deterrence from Israel and Pakistan.
Another important point that often gets missed is that the Iranian President has very little real executive power. The real power in Iran is in the supreme leader, Khamenei, who is an enigmatic figure. The President does not have the authority to declare war, is not the CINC of the armed forces, and does not control the security and intelligence apparatus. The office is still influential, but many, especially in the media, make the mistake of assuming he has similar powers and roles to our own President.
Comment Posted By Andy On 22.08.2006 @ 11:13
I am enjoying reading all of the comments. I have a few more random thoughts:
I don't think you are going to see the Iranian regime 'overthrown' from within or without (if you do, it's going to be bad), but I believe that, provided the middle east does not completely destabilize, Iran will reform. It will help when this completely insane president (I mean Iran's, not ours, heh heh) is out of office. Recall that both Khatami and Rafsanjani were economic reformers and social moderates who provided a much-needed counterpoint to the mullahs. Ahmadinejad is something of an aberration in the Iranian presidency - unfortunately, as many people have commented here, he is completely CRAZY and runs on an Islamic populist, hardcore blood-and-jihad kind of platform. So...this is a particular bad time for the region devolve into instability, with Ahmadinejad at the wheel of Iran. Don't ask me why, but I have a lot of faith in the Iranian people that they will replace him with someone more moderate...provided that he doesn't get to play the hero any more than he already has. In a stable Middle East, the Iranian government will liberalize naturally. Iran has a massive young population that does not appear to be particularly interested in the revolutionary ideals of their parents. In an unstable Middle East, however, all those kids are going to radicalize.
You aren't going to 'solve' terrorism by taking out Iran and Syria. Remember al-Qaeda, the gang that got us into this mess in the first place? They aren't sponsored by Iran or Syria. In fact, when you think about it, al-Qaeda and Iran (and Hezbollah) are enemies, as were al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. I sometimes think all of this is just a prelude to the real battle for control over the middle east, which is going to be between groups like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. The West is practically marginal here - hating America and Israel is just a way for these groups to build a base, gain credibility, and get POWER over their own people and each other.
And as for the United States....you guys I know this is just the wimpiest thing to say, but at the end of the day this is going to be a war of attrition. We are going to be the victims of terror attacks. We will stop most of them but not all of them. So, innocent Americans are going to die, and we are going to have to devote billions of dollars and hours to intelligence in order to minimize those deaths. We can't just go in with guns and rip out the "root cause" of Islamic fundamentalism any more than we could just go in with guns and rip out the root cause of communism. I'm not saying that military action won't sometimes be necessary or appropriate, or that we shouldn't take an active role in encouraging reform in the Middle East, but at the end of the day we are just going to have to outlast this.
Comment Posted By Andy On 22.08.2006 @ 10:45
Whatever goals you folks have in invading Iran, if the goal is to "get rid of the mullahs," that is not going to work. An attack on Iran will galvanize the mullahs. If you kill them all they will be replaced by disciples. You will also destroy the entire nascent Iranian reform movement. I am very disturbed by the comments here to the effect that Iraq is just a staging ground for Iran. What on earth makes you think that an attack on Iran would somehow wind up better than an attack on Iraq? Think about it. We don't have troops to occupy Iraq alone, let alone sufficient troops to occupy Iran. Recall that the Iranian government, oppressive as it is, is not some illegitimate despot but rather was installed in a popular and relatively bloodless revolution - notwithstanding the Iranians who want democratic reform, the Iranian government enjoys much broader support among the Iranians than, say, Saddam Hussein. How do you think seventy million Iranians are going to react to our going in and "taking out" their popular government? First of all, it will be a failure because we won't take out the government, the government will be replaced, except now it will be fully radicalized and the moderating forces of the secular government will be completely radical, and the entire younger generation of Iranians (which is something like 40% of the population and currently supports reform) will become totally radicalized and America-hating. And we will utterly lose Iraq in the process. I have heard some idiotic ideas in my day, and up until now invading Iraq was one of the biggest, but this one takes the cake.
Comment Posted By Andy On 21.08.2006 @ 16:27
Wow, Monday morning and already so many comments...
Rick,
Overall, I agree with your analysis of the current situation. Where I depart company, however, is your second proposed solution. Adding more troops and "resources" will likely not change much from the current situation and could be counterproductive. There are universal calls for "more troops" in the media and among self-described "experts," but often more troops does not equal more effectiveness in this kind of conflict, especially if those troops are not adequately trained in counterinsurgency techniques, tactics and procedures. Sending a bunch of conventional forces into this complex war zone will, in all likelihood, not have the desired effect. This is an example of using conventional war tactics to fight an unconventional war, a mistake which has been repeated throughout history.
Pulling out completely is obviously admitting defeat, but like you indicated, is the best course of action if the war becomes completely unsupportable (and therefore unwinnable). Counterinsurgencies - what we're fighting in Iraq - are ultimately battles of will and attrition for allegiance of a population. They are almost always long, extended, grueling conflicts. Richard in post #32 above gives some great quotes by a guy who knows counterinsurgency.
I've mentioned it before on this site and others, but everyone here should read the Army's new counterinsurgency field manual ( http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf ) for the best primer on fighting insurgencies there is.
In my mind, we have two choices. We can admit defeat and lay the plans for a pullout. The better choice is to recognize this conflict for what it is - a long-term counterinsurgency effort, and work toward winning it. Unfortunately, I don’t think the American people have the stomach for that kind of commitment, considering the blunders made up to this point. Winning would require an adjustment in strategy and tactics, along with a decade or more of commitment on our part. This kind of commitment is necessary because the Iraqi population’s loyalty will not change overnight.
Also, something not often mentioned, is the effect of Saddam’s rule on the psychology of the Iraqi people. His authoritarian rule that prized obedience over initiative turned a generation of regular Iraqi’s into timid people who aren’t accustomed to taking risks. For almost four decades, Saddam made sure that “the tall grass got regularly cut.†This bred in many Iraqis not only a fear of central government and authority, but also the tendency to “stay invisible†and avoid confrontation. This has created a significant hurdle in fighting the insurgency because people that could help with information have been trained by years under Saddam’s rule to keep quiet. It has also enhanced tribal loyalty over that to the central government. It’s difficult to train Iraqi military and police forces to take initiative because it’s simply not something they’re used to doing. Changing these mindsets and galvanizing the silent majority of Iraqi’s to support the central government will take time and training.
Since counterinsurgencies are as much about endurance of will than anything else, it should be no surprise that democracies often fail at combating them. Democracies, or rather the people in them, simply don’t have the political will to recognized and support the kind of long-term commitment necessary for victory. This is especially true with America, which has a notoriously short attention span and memory. So overall, I still believe we could ultimately achieve many of our objectives in Iraq, but no one should be fooled into thinking it will be quick, easy, or simply require “more troops.†It will require a complex, sustainable, long-term strategic and tactical effort. Unfortunately, I just don’t think the American people have the patience to see it through.
Comment Posted By Andy On 21.08.2006 @ 10:07
AN UNSCHOLARLY, NON-LAWYERLY OPINION ON THE NSA DECISION
If my understanding of FISA is correct, there are two basic standards - surveillance on US persons and surveillance on others. Surveillance on US persons still requires a probable cause standard, though it is reduced. For the purposes of intelligence, it may not be possible to meet intelligence requirements given the probable cause standard (though it is less than for criminal requirements). I'm speculating here, but I'm betting this may be the reason for bypassing the FISA court. It's not clear what the court's probable cause standard is in specific cases. For example, would the court allow surveillance of every US phone number found on a captured terrorists phone? There are also the time limitations with FISA. 90 days may seem like a lot, but given the fact that terrorist planning can take years, this isn't a large surveillance window. Again, this is speculation on my part, but I'd guess the administration decided FISA carried too many restrictions. Like others have said, it would have been preferable if the administration had worked with Congress to amend FISA or create a new system to meet it's needs. But with the lack of detailed information and the politically selective leaks, it's hard to say exactly what has or hasn't happened internally.
Comment Posted By Andy On 20.08.2006 @ 11:10
